Control panels and operators for [[calutrons at the
Y-12 Plant in
Oak Ridge, Tennessee. During the Manhattan Project the operators, mostly women, worked in shifts covering 24 hours a day. Gladys Owens, the woman seated at right closest to the camera, was unaware of the purpose and consequence of her work until seeing the photo of herself while taking a public tour of the facility nearly 60 years later.
http://smithdray.angeltowns.net/or/go.htm ]]
[[Los Alamos National Laboratory, aerial view from 1995.]]
The
Manhattan Project, or more formally, the
Manhattan Engineering District, was an effort during
World War II to develop the first
nuclear weapons by the
United States with assistance from the
United Kingdom and
Canada. Its research was directed by American
physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, and overall by General
Leslie R. Groves after it became clear that a weapon based on nuclear fission was possible and that
Nazi Germany was also
investigating such weapons of its own.
Though it involved over thirty different research and production sites, the Manhattan Project was largely carried out in three secret scientific cities that were established by power of
eminent domain:
Hanford, Washington,
Los Alamos, New Mexico, and
Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Some families in Tennessee were given two weeks notice to vacate the family farm lands they had possessed for generations. The
Los Alamos National Laboratory was built on a mesa that previously hosted the Los Alamos Ranch School, a private residential boys school that featured the outdoors and horses (famous alumni included William Burroughs). The
Hanford Site, which grew to almost 1000 square miles (2,600 km²), incorporated land from some farms and two small towns,
Hanford and
White Bluffs. The
Oak Ridge facilities cover more than 60,000 acres (243 km²) of several former farm communities. The existence of these cities was officially kept secret until the end of the war.
The Project culminated in the design, production, and detonation of three nuclear weapons in 1945. The first was on
July 16: "Trinity", the world's first
nuclear test, near
Alamogordo, New Mexico. The second was the weapon "
Little Boy", detonated on
August 6, over the city of
Hiroshima,
Japan. The third was the weapon "
Fat Man", detonated on
August 9, over the city of
Nagasaki, Japan.
The primary sites of the project exist today as
Hanford Site,
Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the
National Security Complex and several other plants.
By 1945, the Project employed over 130,000 people at its peak and cost a total of nearly $2 billion USD ($20 billion in 2004 dollars based on
CPI.
http://www.brookings.edu/FP/PROJECTS/NUCWCOST/MANHATTN.HTM).
History
In the years between
World War I and
World War II, the United States had risen to pre-eminence in
nuclear physics, driven by the work of recent immigrants and local physicists. These scientists had developed the basic tools of nuclear--
cyclotrons and other particle accelerators - and many new substances using these tools, including radioisotopes like
Carbon-14.
Early ideas on nuclear energy
One of the early [[particle accelerators responsible for development of the atomic bomb, and used to assist in research related to the Manhattan Project. Built in 1937 by
Philips of
Eindhoven it currently resides in the National Science Museum in
London.]]
Enrico Fermi recalled the beginning of the project in a speech given in 1954 when he retired as President of the
APS.
:''I remember very vividly the first month, January 1939, that I started working at the Pupin Laboratories because things began happening very fast. In that period,
Niels Bohr was on a lecture engagement in
Princeton and I remember one afternoon
Willis Lamb came back very excited and said that Bohr had leaked out great news. The great news that had leaked out was the discovery of
fission and at least the outline of its interpretation. Then, somewhat later that same month, there was a meeting in Washington where the possible importance of the newly discovered phenomenon of fission was first discussed in semi-jocular earnest as a possible source of
nuclear power.''
Nuclear scientists
Leó Szilárd,
Edward Teller and
Eugene Wigner (all
Hungarian Jewish refugees from Hitler's Europe) believed that the energy released in nuclear fission might be used in bombs by the Germans. They persuaded
Albert Einstein, America's most famous physicist, to warn President
Franklin D. Roosevelt of this danger in an
August 2, 1939 letter which Szilárd drafted
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_einstein.html. In response to the warning, Roosevelt encouraged further research into the national security implications of nuclear fission. Einstein later commented "I could burn my fingers that I wrote that first letter to Roosevelt." after the bombing of Hiroshima. The Navy awarded the first atomic energy funding of $6,000 for graphite for experiments, which grew into the Manhattan Project under scientific leadership of J. Robert Oppenheimer and
Enrico Fermi.
Roosevelt created an
ad hoc Uranium Committee under the chairmanship of National Bureau of Standards chief Lyman Briggs. It began small research programs in 1939 at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, where physicist
Philip Abelson explored
uranium isotope separation. At
Columbia University Italian-born nuclear physicist
Enrico Fermi built prototype
nuclear reactors using various configurations of graphite and
uranium. On October 9, 1941 Roosevelt authorized atomic weapon development.
Vannevar Bush, director of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, organized the
National Defense Research Committee in 1940 to mobilize the United States' scientific resources in support of the war effort.
New laboratories were created, including the
Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which aided the development of
radar, and the
Underwater Sound Laboratory at
San Diego, which developed
sonar.
The National Defense Research Council (NDRC) also took over the uranium project, as Briggs' program in nuclear physics was called. In 1940, Bush and Roosevelt created the
Office of Scientific Research and Development to expand these efforts.
The uranium project had not made much progress by the spring of 1941, when word came from Britain of calculations by Otto Frisch and Fritz Peierls. The report, prepared by the so-called MAUD Committee, itself a sub-committee of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare under G.P. Thomson, professor of physics at Imperial College, London, showed that a very small amount of the fissionable
isotope of uranium, U-235 - could produce an explosion equivalent to that of several thousand tons of
TNT.
The
National Academy of Sciences proposed an all-out effort to build nuclear weapons. Bush created a special committee, the S-1 Committee, to guide the effort. This happened to be on the day before the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, which was on
December 7th, 1941, and meant the start of the war for the United States.
At the University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, the University of California Radiation Laboratory and
Columbia University's physics department, efforts to prepare the nuclear materials for a weapon were accelerated. Uranium 235 had to be separated from uranium ore and plutonium made by neutron bombardment of natural uranium. Beginning in 1942, huge plants were built at
Oak Ridge (Site X) in
Tennessee and
Hanford (Site W) outside of
Richland, Washington, to produce these materials.
When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, several projects were under way to investigate the separation of fissionable uranium 235 from uranium 238, the manufacture of plutonium, and the feasibility of nuclear piles and explosions.
Physicist and Nobel laureate Arthur Holly Compton organized the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago in early 1942 to study
plutonium and fission piles. Compton asked theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer of the
University of California to take over research on fast neutron calculations, essential to the feasibility of a
nuclear weapon.
John Manley, a physicist at the University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, was assigned to help Oppenheimer find answers by coordinating and contacting several experimental physics groups scattered across the country.
In the spring of 1942, Oppenheimer and
Robert Serber of the
University of Illinois, worked on the problems of
neutron diffusion (how neutrons moved in the
chain reaction) and
hydrodynamics (how the explosion produced by the chain reaction might behave).
To review this work and the general theory of fission reactions, Oppenheimer convened a summer study at the
University of California, Berkeley in June 1942. Theorists
Hans Bethe, John Van Vleck,
Edward Teller,
Felix Bloch, Emil Konopinski,
Robert Serber, Stanley S. Frankel, and Eldred C. Nelson (the latter three all former students of Oppenheimer) concluded that a fission bomb was feasible. The scientists suggested that such a reaction could be initiated by assembling a
critical mass - an amount of nuclear explosive adequate to sustain it - either by firing two subcritical masses of plutonium or uranium 235 together or by imploding (crushing) a hollow sphere made of these materials with a blanket of high explosives. (Serber credits an early idea of implosion to Tolman). Until the numbers were better known, this was all that could be done.
Teller saw another possibility: By surrounding a fission bomb with
deuterium and
tritium, a much more powerful "superbomb" (which he called simply, the "Super") might be constructed. This concept was based on studies of energy production in stars made by Bethe before the war. When the detonation wave from the fission bomb moved through the mixture of deuterium and tritium nuclei, they would fuse together to produce much more energy than fission could, in the process of
nuclear fusion, just as elements fused in the sun produce light and heat.
Bethe was skeptical, and as Teller pushed hard for his "superbomb", and proposed scheme after scheme, Bethe refuted each one. The idea had to be put aside while the fission bombs, and the war, were completed. (The "super", or thermonuclear device, was produced after the war and tested in 1952, after an acrimonious political fight pitting Teller against Oppenheimer, leading to loss of Oppenheimer's official status, and using methods different than Teller's specific ideas, which Bethe was correct in refuting.)
Teller also raised the speculative possibility that an atomic bomb might "ignite" the atmosphere, due to a hypothetical fusion reaction of nitrogen nuclei. Bethe showed, according to Serber, theoretically that it couldn't happen; in his book
The Road from Los Alamos, Bethe says a refutation was written by Konopinski, C. Marvin, and Teller as report LA-602 (declassified Feb. 1973
online), showing that it was impossible, not just unlikely. In Serber's account, Oppenheimer unfortunately mentioned it to
Arthur Compton, who "didn't have enough sense to shut up about it. It somehow got into a document that went to Washington" which lead to the question "never [being] laid to rest". In Bethe's account, this ultimate catastrophe came up again in 1975 when it appeared in a magazine article by H. C. Dudley, who got the idea from a report by Pearl Buck of an interview she had with Arthur Compton in 1959, where she completely misunderstood Compton! The worry was not entirely extinguished in some people's minds until the Trinity test; though if Bethe had been wrong, we would never know.
The summer conferences, the results of which were later summarized by Serber in "The Los Alamos Primer" (LA-1
online), provided the original theoretical basis for the design of the atomic bomb, which was to become the principal task at Los Alamos during the war, and the idea of the H-bomb, which was to haunt the Laboratory in the postwar era.
The measurements of the interactions of fast neutrons with the materials in a bomb are essential because the number of neutrons produced in the fission of uranium and plutonium must be known, and because the substance surrounding the nuclear material must have the ability to reflect, or scatter, neutrons back into the chain reaction before it is blown apart in order to increase the energy produced. Therefore, the neutron scattering properties of materials had to be measured to find the best reflectors.
Estimating the explosive power required knowledge of many other nuclear properties, including the
cross section (a measure of the probability of an encounter between particles that result in a specified effect) for nuclear processes of neutrons in uranium and other elements. Fast neutrons could only be produced in particle accelerators, which were still relatively uncommon instruments in physics departments in 1942.
The need for better coordination was clear. By September 1942, the difficulties involved with conducting preliminary studies on nuclear weapons at universities scattered throughout the country indicated the need for a laboratory dedicated solely to that purpose. The need for it, however, was overshadowed by the demand for plants to produce uranium-235 and plutonium - the fissionable materials that would provide the nuclear explosives.
Vannevar Bush, the head of the civilian
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), asked President Roosevelt to assign the large-scale operations connected with the quickly growing nuclear weapons project to the military. Roosevelt chose the Army to work with the OSRD in building production plants. The Army Corps of Engineers selected Col. James Marshall to oversee the construction of factories to separate uranium isotopes and manufacture plutonium for the bomb.
OSRD scientists had explored several methods to produce plutonium and separate uranium-235 from uranium, but none of the processes was ready for production - only microscopic amounts had been prepared.
Only one method - electromagnetic separation, which had been developed by
Ernest Lawrence at the University of California Radiation Laboratory at the
University of California, Berkeley - seemed promising at the time for large-scale production. But scientists could not stop studying other potential methods of producing fissionable materials, because it was so expensive and because it was unlikely that it alone could produce enough material before the war was over.
Marshall and his deputy, Col. Kenneth Nichols, had to struggle to understand both the processes and the scientists with whom they had to work. Thrust suddenly into the new field of nuclear physics, they felt unable to distinguish between technical and personal preferences. Although they decided that a site near Knoxville, Tenn., would be suitable for the first production plant, they didn't know how large the site had to be and so put off its acquisition. There were other problems, too.
Because of its experimental nature, the nuclear weapons work could not compete with the Army's more-urgent tasks for top-priority ratings. The selection of scientists' work and production-plant construction often were delayed by Marshall's inability to get the critical materials, such as steel, that also were needed in other military productions.
Even selecting a name for the new Army project was difficult. The title chosen by Gen. Brehon Somervell, "Development of Substitute Materials," was objectionable because it seemed to reveal too much.
The Manhattan Engineering District
In the summer of 1942, Col.
Leslie Groves was deputy to the chief of construction for the Army Corps of Engineers and had overseen construction of
the Pentagon, the world's largest office building. Hoping for an overseas command, Groves objected when Somervell appointed him to take charge of the weapons project. His objections were overruled and Groves resigned himself to leading a project he thought had little chance of succeeding.
A selection of U.S. sites important to the Manhattan Project.
The first thing he did was rechristen the project
The Manhattan District. The name evolved from the Corps of Engineers practice of naming districts after its headquarters' city (Marshall's headquarters were in New York City). At the same time, Groves was promoted to brigadier general, which gave him the rank thought necessary to deal with the senior scientists in the project.
Within a week of his appointment, Groves had solved the Manhattan Project's most urgent problems. His forceful and effective manner was soon to become all too familiar to the atomic scientists.
The first major scientific hurdle of the project was solved on
December 2, 1942 below the bleachers of
Stagg Field at the
University of Chicago. Then and there a team led by
Enrico Fermi initiated the first self-sustaining
nuclear chain reaction. A coded phone call from Compton saying, "The Italian navigator (referring to Fermi) has landed in the new world, the natives are friendly" to Conant in Washington, DC, brought the news that the experiment was a success. This was a major turning point!
The two different paths to the bomb
The industrial problem centered on the production of sufficient fissile material, of sufficient purity. Two separate, completely parallel efforts were undertaken to do this, and the results are represented in the single test and the two bombs which were dropped.
The
Hiroshima bomb,
Little Boy, was based on uranium-235, a rare
isotope of
uranium that has to be
physically separated from more prevalent uranium-238 isotope, which is not suitable for use in an explosive device. The separation was effected mostly by gaseous diffusion of
uranium hexafluoride (
UF6), but also by other techniques, such as thermal diffusion, and the
calutron method, using the mass spectrometer principle of magnetic separation. The bulk of this separation work was done at
Oak Ridge. The bomb itself used the so-called "gun" mechanism to assemble a
critical mass of the fissile U-235; one mass of U-235 was fired down a tube into another mass.
In contrast, the devices used in the first and only test, and also the
Nagasaki bomb,
Fat Man, consisted primarily of
plutonium-239. This is a synthetic element which, in the form created by the reactors used to produce it, contains too much of an isotope which too readily undergoes fission for it to be used in gun type device. (The issue is that due to the relatively slow assembly speed of the gun type device, the bomb will "fizzle"; i.e. blow itself apart before it develops maximum power.) A so-called "implosion" device, in which a sphere of fissile material was collapsed on itself, promised faster assembly, and thus offered a solution to the problem. The design of an implosion device was at the center of the efforts by physicists at
Los Alamos during the Project.
The property of uranium-238 which makes it less suitable directly for use in an atomic bomb is used in the production of plutonium -- with sufficiently slow neutrons, uranium-238 will absorb neutrons and transmute into plutonium-239. The production and purification of plutonium was at the center of wartime, and post-war, efforts at the
Hanford Site, using techniques developed in part by Glenn Seaborg.
The first live test of the plutonium bomb was on
July 16, 1945, near Alamagordo, New Mexico, and was code-named "Trinity". "The energy developed in the test was several times greater than that expected by scientific group." (
Official report)
Similar efforts
A similar effort was undertaken in the
USSR headed by
Igor Kurchatov (with a specific difference in that some of Kurchatov's World War II investigations came secondhand from Manhattan Project countries, thanks to spies, including at least two on the scientific team at Los Alamos,
Klaus Fuchs and
Theodore Hall, unknown to each other). Token efforts in
Germany, (headed by
Werner Heisenberg,) and in
Japan, were also undertaken during the war.
Together with the
cryptographic efforts centered at
Bletchley Park in England,
Arlington Hall and the
Naval Communications Annex (both in commandeered private girls' schools in Washington DC), and the development of microwave
radar at
MIT's Radiation Lab, the Manhattan Project represents one of few massive, secret, and outstandingly successful technological efforts spawned by the conflict of
World War II.
See also
Further reading
- Badash, Lawrence, Joseph O. Hirschfelder, Herbert P. Broida, (eds) Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945, Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1980, Order: ISBN 902771097X, LoC QC791.96.R44
- Bethe, Hans A. The Road from Los Alamos, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1991, Order: ISBN 0671740121
- Groueff, Stephane, Manhattan Project: The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1967) The definitive history of the technical work of the Project, including many of its little-known technical achievments.
- Jungk, Robert, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists, (NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1956, 1958)
- Groves, Leslie, Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper, 1962) The managerial history of the Project, by its leader.
- Herken, Gregg, Brotherhood of the Bomb : The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002). Order: ISBN 0805065881
- Hoddeson, Lillian, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine L. Westfall, Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos Druring the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945, Cambridge, 1993
- Nichols, Kenneth David, The Road to Trinity: A Personal Account of How America's Nuclear Policies Were Made (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc, 1987). Order: ISBN 068806910X
- Rhodes, Richard, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) Order: ISBN 0671441337 An excellent contemporary overall history of the Project.
- Serber, Robert, The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb (University of California Press, 1992) Order: ISBN 0520075765 Original 1943, "LA-1", declassified in 1965. (Available on Wikimedia Commons).
- Serber, Robert, Peace and War: Reminiscences of a Life on the Frontiers of Science, (NY: Columbia Un. Press, 1998), Order: ISBN 0231105460, LoC QC16.S46A3 1998
- Sherwin, Martin J., A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975). Order: ISBN 0394497945
- Smyth, Henry DeWolf, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes; the Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945). (Smyth Report)
External links
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